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SRT - WAR FOR THE WAVES 
At midnight, on the night of 
September 11, Republika Srpska 
Television broadcast live a historic 
meeting. Representatives of the Pale-
run Srpska Radio-Television (SRT), 
and representatives of OSCE, SFOR, 
and the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), met in a 
discussion that verged on the 
amicable. Miroslav Toholj, director-
general of SRT, was present, openly 
cooperating with those whom less 
than a week beforehand (September 
8) he condemned for their ‘black 
repertoire of violence’ inflicted upon 
SRT. Now he was publicly agreeing to 
allow them their own prime-time 
slots. What was the background to 
this astonishing - and rapid - change 
of heart? And why did the arrival on 
the scene of three NATO planes 
carrying jamming equipment pass 
unmentioned? 
Monitoring Report described last 
fortnight how the Udrigovo transmitter 
was handed back to the Serb Denocratic 
Party (SDS) representatives on September 
2 by the SFOR troops who were guarding 
it, and how it returned to transmitting the 
Pale-run version of SRT. (While under 
SFOR guardianship the transmitter had 
spent a brief period relaying SRT Banja 
Luka, sympathetic to beleaguered RS 
president Biljana Plavsic.)  
In return for resuming control of the 
transmitter, the SDS (which rules from 
Pale) and SRT - both represented in 
Momcilo Krajisnik, who leads the former 
and sits on the board of the latter - signed 
an agreement. This guaranteed half an 
hour’s presence daily on prime-time 
viewing to international representatives, 
together with an hour for opposition 
parties. It also guaranteed that SRT would 
refrain in the future from ‘inflammatory 
reporting’ against the international 
community (though specifying nothing 
about the local community). 
However, neither international 
officials nor opposition parties appeared 
on Pale SRT during the next few days. 
On September 6 the RS Minister of 
Information, Svetlana Slijegovic, issued 
an announcement on radio and television: 
‘We must do absolutely everything, within 
the frame of our profession (meaning 
journalism) to safeguard the Republika 
Srpska’.    
OHR and SFOR, which had jointly 
signed the Udrigovo agreement over the 
transmitter, sent a letter to Pale SRT to 
demand that its terms be put into force. 
Miroslav Toholj’s reply was read out 
repeatedly, at hourly intervals, on Pale 
SRT on the night of September 8. He 
called their letter ‘an eternal document of 
attempts to choke freedom and human 
rights.’ The requests contained in it ‘fell 
within the blackest repertoire of violence 
against the freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression’. He asked what 
had become of the West’s ostensible 
respect for democracy and professional 
journalism. He concluded with a refusal 
to negotiate further. 
Challenge to ’Granny’ Plavsic 
Viewing that night was further spiced 
by the main news item - audiences 
learned that ‘the world is waiting with 
great attention for the Pan-Serb (SDS) 
rally’ which was to take place in Banja 
Luka. The camera showed busloads of 
SDS followers setting off from Pale, 
waving flags and pictures of Radovan 
Karadzic. The occupants were shouting 
‘We are going to see what kind of Serbs 
they are there, and then we will know 
what to do’. Biljana Plavsic was referred 
to as ‘Granny’, the Bosniaks as ‘Turks’, 
SFOR as ‘the occupiers’.  
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But on September 9, came the news 
that Toholj would take part in the 
September 11 meeting. On September 10 
High Representative Carlos Westendorp 
appeared at prime time  - although 
promptly followed by the jingle ‘Don’t 
weaken the Serb nation - vote for the 
SDS.’ And, during the historic midnight 
meeting, Toholj conceded that he would 
discuss future programming with the 
OSCE and OHR, would carry SFOR 
spots about the elections, would no 
longer carry spots derogatory to the 
international community, would ensure 
that the Pale SRT of the future would be 
a model of non-inflammatory reporting. 
(Toholj was last quoted by Monitoring 
Report warning of future ‘blood and 
destruction, in which the RS becomes a 
cheap, bagatelle, gift to its enemies.’ See 
Volume 3, issue 5.)  
Only those viewers who sat up after 
the meeting ended at a quarter past one 
a.m. could have learned what was 
presumably the motive for this abrupt 
change of attitude - that three NATO 
planes carrying equipment for jamming 
electronic signals had arrived in Italy. The 
presenter mentioned them very briefly, 
before finishing the night’s programming. 
They had not emerged in the newscasts 
earlier in the evening of September 11. 
The main newscast itself had featured 
very different topics that night - the 
increasing agricultural and industrial 
prosperity of the Republika Srpska, the 
opening of new roads, the building of 
new houses, improvements in telecom-
munications, the water system, the post 
office. It featured the glad news that 
pensioners were about to receive their 
May pensions; that teachers and other 
social-sector employees (usually the latest 
and the worst paid) were that very day 
receiving their salaries. It was bright and 
positive. 
’Banja Luka crowds worse than 
Croats or Muslims’ - Krajisnik 
It was followed by the most dramatic 
of Pale Srpska Television’s clips from the 
stirring events in Banja Luka and Bijelina 
a few days before (already shown on the 
newscasts of September 8 and 9). 
Momcilo Krajsnik and his bodyguard 
were shown besieged in the Hotel Bosna 
in Banja Luka, having their baggage 
searched and various weapons removed 
by members of SFOR and the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF). 
The camera then showed them exiting 
the hotel, surrounded by a hostile crowd 
of locals shouting ‘Monkeys!’ The picture 
moved to Bijelina, and showed Krajisnik 
speaking at a huge SDS rally, telling his 
audience that he had never seen such 
hatred as he had in the eyes of the Banja 
Luka crowds - ‘not even in the eyes of 
Croats and Muslims.’ It then moved to 
the confrontation between the SDS 
members and SFOR members in 
Armoured Personnel Carriers who were 
preventing busloads of SDS members 
armed with sticks and stones from 
entering Bijelina. The Serbs were beating 
the APCs with sticks and hurling stones 
at their occupants, who were forced to 
fall back (the clip stopped before the 
point at which SFOR reinforcements 
successfully blocked the road, and the 
buses were forced to turn home.)  
Thus Pale Srpska Television managed, 
in spite of all, to issue a message of 
triumph over foreign power, and at the 
same time promoted the SDS - although 
September 11 was the first day of 
electoral silence.  
But, though hardly subtle, the 
methods Pale-run SRT has been using 
since September 11 to convey its 
messages are a far cry from the diatribes 
and heroics formerly produced by its 
commentators. The current methods 
include leaving pauses of several minutes 
during which the audience can see 
nothing but a logo, before international 
officials are shown, and the use of 
extremely hostile presenters (and 
sometimes inept trnaslators) to mediate 
between the officials and their audience. 
But the patches of violent commentary 
have thinned out considerably, and what 
remains is comparatively mild - at least, as 
far as items on the international 
community are concerned.  
There are exceptions  - they include 
commentary on the voting in Brcko. 
‘“There will be as many votes as the 
international community planned” as one 
of the humiliated and insulted Serbs in 
Brcko told us’, said reporter Gajo 
Mitrovic on the eve of the elections. 
Presenter Dusko Oljaca concluded ‘the 
international community wants to 
reconstruct the pre-war ethnic 
distribution.’ But this was the limit of 
hostility openly expressed. (12/9, Srpska 
Television) 
That hostility is continuing to express 
itself against targets other than the 
international community is clear from the 
number of times President Plavsic 
appeared in a negative context on Pale-
run television and radio during the 
monitored period (25 altogether). Also, in 
spite of the terms of the Udrigovo 
transmitter agreement, not a single 
opposition party appeared on Pale SRT, 
prior to or after the elections. (A rally by 
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members of the Cetnik movement, was 
covered (10/9), but both organisations 
are strongly affiliated to the SDS.) The 
appearance of Momcilo Krajisnik, on the 
morning of the first day of elections 
(13/9), and his statement that ‘the people 
will give its voice for a united RS’, 
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
electoral media silence. 
The threat of jamming, therefore, has 
only been effective as far as the 
international community is concerned. 
But will the international community’s 
latest demonstration of superior strength 
and technology be either lasting or 
positive in its effect? 
 THE ETHICS OF  
 JAMMING 
Monitoring Report spoke to Chris 
Bennett of the International Crisis Group 
(ICG), and OHR spokesman Duncan 
Bullivant, both of whom are viewed in 
the Pale studios of SRT as being directly 
responsible for the current course of 
events. Neither likes the policy of 
jamming: ‘it should be a policy of last 
resort’ says Bennett. But Bullivant adds ‘if 
the international community is serious 
about dealing with the failures of the civil 
aspects of Dayton, then the misconduct 
of SRT must be dealt with in a decisive 
manner. We cannot afford to discard any 
options, regardless of how distasteful they 
may seem.’ 
But although international officials 
find this option distasteful, Pale SRT has 
so far failed, since the NATO planes and 
their jamming equipment arrived, to play 
in public its normally treasured role as 
victim of foreign tyranny. The near-
silence maintained by SRT on the topic of 
jamming is echoed in SDS-approved RS 
daily Glas Srpski, which normally reflects 
SRT editorial positions. The paper carried 
a one-line report on the presence of the 
planes on September 12, stating that their 
future movements were as yet unknown. 
Nothing has been said subsequently.  
Nor are independent media in Banja 
Luka publicly displaying any glee over the 
concessions that SRT Pale has been 
forced to make to the international 
community. Perica Vucinic, Editor in 
Chief of independent Banja Luka based 
bi-monthly magazine Reporter, told 
Monitoring Report that he thinks the NATO 
action is ‘naïve’. ‘It will simply increase 
xenophobia; people will feel that what 
they are hearing is SFOR’s version of the 
truth, rather than the real truth.’  
As to why SRT’s public reaction to the 
threats has been so low-key, when 
Toholj’s initial response - to the letter 
which requested implementation of the 
Udrigovo agreement - was so fiery, 
nobody has any answers. The only local 
journalist Monitoring Report approached 
who was prepared to speculate, was 
Hamza Baksic, columnist of Sarajevo 
daily Oslobodjenje. ‘SRT is in an unfamiliar 
situation. They have lost much of their 
control of the RS audience, to SRT Banja 
Luka, and to the internationals. It is 
possible that they are just trying to be 
careful, or that they don’t want to admit 
how bad their situation is, or even that 
they are planning a new strategy.’ 
NATO Rules the Airwaves 
SRT Pale representatives do not yet 
appear to have challenged the legality of 
the jamming threat. Were they to do so, 
however, they might be on difficult 
ground.   
The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges 
governments to ‘prohibit by law 
..advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence’. 
(Article 20, item 2). This includes media 
output. International law permits the 
international community to intervene, 
either if the government of the country 
whose media are in contravention of the 
ICCPR so requests, or if there is clear 
evidence that the broadcasts could incite 
crimes against humanity. (Although the 
government of the RS has not requested 
any such intervention, as a non-sovereign 
body its wishes give precedent to the 
State of BiH.) 
Under article 70 of the Sintra 
Declaration (August 30 1997) OHR 
became entitled to ‘curtail or suspend any 
media network or programme whose 
output is in persistent contravention of 
either the spirit or the letter of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.’ Under Annex 
One of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
NATO is granted ultimate control of the 
airwaves.  
Thus far therefore, the jamming threat 
seems justifiable under law. However, the 
circumstances under which the 
international community’s representatives 
chose to exercise the threat are more 
dubious. If SRT’s refusal to cooperate 
with the terms of the Udrigovo 
agreement was the motivation, it can be 
noted that the implementation of the 
agreement specifically concerns media 
treatment of internationals, not of locals. 
If the call to violence against SFOR 
troops issued on August 28 by radios 
Brcko and Bijelina, was the motive, this 
too concerns violence against foreigners 
rather than locals. If free and fair election 
coverage was hoped for, those hopes 
must have been dashed. SRT Pale is still 
not granting opposition views the hour’s 
airing stipulated by the Udrigovo 
agreement.  
If the jamming threat has any ultimate 
benefit to offer the people of BiH, this 
can only be an indirect result of the 
foothold the international community has 
gained on the airwaves of SRT. It remains 
to be seen what steps will be taken from 
this point.  
Negotiations currently aim for a future 
in which SRT Pale will carry the 
newscasts of SRT Banja Luka, and vice 
versa. This would at least ensure that 
people in all parts of the country have 
access to politically plural televsion, 
regardless of the quality of the television 
itself. However, Pale SRT and its 
counterpart in Banja Luka remain 
obstinately divided. The rift between 
them has been deepened by Pale 
perceptions that SRT Banja Luka is 
favoured by the international community, 
while SRT Pale is scapegoated. (‘When 
are you going to sort out our studio in 
Banja Luka?’ is a question Pale SRT 
presenters repeatedly put to the 
international representatives who now 
appear in prime-time.) Pale SRT is 
turning more and more to events in 
Belgrade, and to quotes from the Russian 
Press for news. SRT Banja Luka 
continues, meanwhile, to suggest siege-
mentality by its negative outlook on news 
items which fall outside the Banja Luka 
sphere.  
What is more, both are so absorbed in 
their internal strife, and their separate 
versions of reality, that news coverage of 
events in the ‘Muslim-Croat’ BiH 
Federation is growing weaker by the day. 
It now consists of the barest minimum of 
late, perpetually negative, agency items, 
appearing always at the tail-end of the 
news. The ultimate impact of the war for 
the waves has been to further split an 
already fragmented media landscape. 
’THESE WERE NOT 
DIGNIFIED ELECTIONS’ - 
TV BiH, 13/9 
The elections tried media 
professionalism in BiH to its limits. Some 
passed the test superlatively; others 
succumbed to bias or the temptation to 
manipulate audiences or readers. Official 
media in particular - Pale RTV, RTV BiH, 
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and the media of Western Hercegovina - 
put on a display that hardly differed in 
kind from the presidential elections of a 
year ago. However, the behaviour of the 
independent media was more 
encouraging. 
The Open Broadcast Network (OBN), 
Independent Studio 99, Sarajevo dailies 
Oslobodjenje and Vecernje Novine, and Banja 
Luka daily Dnevne Nezavisne Novine stood 
out for political plurality. All five gave 
broad coverage to opposition parties - 
though they tended to prioritise parties in 
the entities where these media are 
themselves principally based.  
Here OBN’s advantage of a broader 
base than any other electronic medium 
made itself felt - it featured the RS Serb 
Patriotic party, and the Serb Radical 
Party, as well as the main Federation 
parties. On the other hand, Independent 
Studio 99’s newscast Oko 22 carried a 
wider variety of parties within the 
Federation, including the recently-
founded (multi-ethnic) Party of Natural 
Law, the Croat Peasant Party, and the 
Liberal Bosniak organisation. (Oko 22 has 
also started to relay film reports from 
Banja Luka, instead of relying exclusively 
on the telephone.) 
Multi-ethnicity on Oko 22  
Oko 22 carried an impressive number 
of interviews with non-Bosniak members 
of coalitions and parties. These included 
Stjepan Kljuc (of the Republican Party , 
one of the less-shown members of the 
Joint List ’97 coalition); Stipe Mesic of 
the Croatian Independent Democratic 
party (HND), as a guest from Croatia, 
and Bogic Bogicevic (Serb) and Gradimir 
Gojer (Croat) of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). It was also unique in 
running a detailed item on the League of 
Women Voters. (9/9)   
Oko 22 carried Alija Izetbegovic less 
than any other Sarajevo medium (three 
times) and has reduced the space it 
normally reserves for Co-president of the 
Council of Ministers Haris Silajdzic (who 
appeared five times). Oko 22 was also 
unique among Federation media in 
mentioning Silajdzic’s counterpart, Boro 
Bosic, twice - the same number of times 
the Serb co-president of the Council 
appeared on SRT. (TV BiH, OBN, and 
the Sarajevo daily press mentioned him 
once only; the Hercegovina-based media 
not at all.)  
But the biggest difference between 
Oko 22 and the other Sarajevo-based 
media emerged in their treatment of the 
HDZ - the Croatian Democratic Union, 
Croatia’s ruling party and the most 
powerful party of the Bosnian Croats. 
The approaches of all media to this party 
during the monitored period help explain 
why, when not appearing on Oko 22, 
HDZ officials generally prefer to speak 
with Croatia and Herzegovina-based 
media.  
The HDZ was involved in a series of 
significant events: not only as the main 
party of the Croat nation, but because it 
was the target for a number of attacks 
from several different directions. Its 
leaders were publicly accused of criminal 
or near criminal activities (by Sarajevo-
based magazine Dani, and by president of 
the Croat Party of Rights 1861, 
Dobroslav Paraga, who was guest on 
several BiH media). By the decision of 
OSCE, it lost candidates  or potential 
voters in Zepce, Capljina, Drvar, and the 
central district of Mostar. The HDZ  
decided at one point to boycott the 
elections, and changed its mind at the 
very last minute. The BiH media were 
presented with a number of HDZ-
centred stories to cover, and did so with a 
variety of attitudes.    
The approach of the Croat media can 
be described first and most easily - Radio 
and Television Herceg-Bosna were 
overwhelmingly supportive and entirely 
uncritical of the HDZ, as were Croat 
Television Mostar, and Slobodna Dalmacija. 
The first three virtually ignored even the 
Croat opposition, and mentioned multi-
ethnic, Bosniak, or Serb parties in a 
negative context only, and very rarely.  
The Least Extreme.. 
The least extreme of the media 
available in Hercegovina, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, did publish an article on the 
Croat Christian Democratic Union 
(HKDU), and quoted its leader, Anton 
Kovacevic, calling for stronger ties with 
the Bosniaks. Also mentioned was the 
Croat Party of Rights (HSP) whose 
president Zdravko Hrstic had a similar 
message (5/9). Slobodna Dalmacija also 
carried the multi-ethnic SDP (Social 
Democratic Party), quoting their denial 
that the Sarajevo-based media favour 
them (5/9). Otherwise, however, Slobodna 
Dalmacija concentrated on the HDZ. 
When Sarajevo monthly magazine 
Dani published an alleged OSCE 
document which implied that key HDZ 
figures Franjo Tudjman, Croatia Minister 
of Defence Gojko Susak, and President 
of the Federation Vladimir Soljic, were 
involved in mafia activities during the 
war, Slobodna Dalmacija did not bother to 
investigate any of the allegations. It 
retaliated by smearing the Bosniak deputy 
mayor of Mostar, Safet Orucevic, as 
being himself a mafioso (5/9). When 
Dobroslav Paraga, of the Croatian Party 
of Rights 1861 went public on TV BiH 
with accusations of Croat President 
Franjo Tudjman as being heavily 
responsible for the Bosniak-Croat 
conflict, Slobodna Dalmacijia again failed to 
treat the allegations seriously. Instead it 
launched a diatribe against the Sarajevo 
media for covering Paraga, and added 
that their coverage was valueless, on 
account of the poor treatment Croats 
always receive in Sarajevo (5/9).      
TV Herceg-Bosna did not even 
trouble to describe what Paraga’s 
statements were, merely carrying the 
protest letter the HDZ put out on the 
occasion (5/9) TV Herceg-Bosna’s 
commentators were unwavering in their 
identification of HDZ interests with 
those of the Croat people as a whole. 
While Slobodna Dalmacija contented itself 
with simply quoting HDZ leaders 
explaining their reasons, TV Herceg-
Bosna presenter Saska Cokovic 
exclaimed: ‘After all pressures.. blame 
where there is no guilt; condemnation 
without trial.. the HDZ has taken a 
decision which shows the international 
community that they can do as they want 
with the Croat people, but not to the 
extent that they want.’ (9/9) 
Croat TV Mostar precisely mirrored 
the attitudes of TV Herceg-Bosna. It 
presented the HDZ decision to boycott 
as a universal decision supported by every 
Croat. Vox-pops conducted repeatedly in 
the streets of West Mostar always 
produced an unvarying message - that all 
Croats agreed only the HDZ could 
protect their interests.  
’Miserable Dungbeetles’ 
Radio Herceg-Bosna showed no 
deviation from the path traced by its 
fellow Bosnian Croat media. Presenter 
Ivan Kristic spoke of ‘yet another 
prejudiced attempt by international 
bureaucrats and spies to cheat and 
manipulate the Croats, using subversive-
confidential machinations, and make 
them the losers. That group of  ‘Miserable 
Dungbeetles’, who come, pass through, 
and leave, are not important anyway. We, 
the Croat nation, are the oldest in the 
state of BiH, dating from the seventh 
century, and we will hold on to our own 
for ever’. (12/9) Coming as this statement 
did, immediately after the HDZ had 
revoked its decision to boycott, it 
contributed noticeably to pre-election 
tensions in Mostar. 
The Sarajevo-based media were not 
particularly sympathetic. Only Oko 22 
showed itself to be open to, and 
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responsive to, the HDZ, and those of its 
leaders included in the Federation 
government. Oko 22 interviewed 
Vladimir Soljic twice in the monitored 
period, and carried letters from HDZ 
BiH president Bozo Rajic (who was 
shown reading his declaration on screen), 
Member of the BiH presidency Kresimir 
Zubak, and Joze Leutar of the HDZ 
Sarajevo committee. Oko 22 carried all 
HDZ responses to the Dani and Paraga 
stories, together with detailed coverage of 
the two bombs which exploded in 
Sarajevo near Croat institutions (3/9 and 
13/9) and further reactions to the August 
30 killing of a Croat father and son in 
Travnik.   
OBN, meanwhile, made its position 
plain regarding the HDZ on September 4, 
when it covered an HDZ Zenica 
committee meeting. The presenter was 
shocked to hear the participants 
commence with a rendering of the 
Croatian National Anthem. ‘This is 
obviously part of a strategy which has as 
its goal the stirring-up of mistrust, and 
efforts to prove that multi-ethnic 
communal living in this country is 
impossible.. As to the creators of this 
policy, no one says anything openly. 
Except those who are in The Hague, or 
who are potential travellers to The 
Hague.’ On the subject of the proposed 
boycott, OBN left the commentary 
mainly to international representatives, 
rather than inviting HDZ officials to 
comment.  
RTV BiH 
Radio BiH frankly gloated over HDZ 
troubles - the commentator suggested 
that ‘the HDZ aren’t going to participate 
because they are afraid of the cost’ and 
speculated obscurely that ‘the HDZ has 
suffered the fate of the SDS’ (10/9). On 
the day that the boycott was announced 
(9/9) Radio BiH scheduled the news for 
the end of their newscast. (It was first 
item on the Oko 22 and the OBN 
schedules).  
TV BiH gave far less time to the issue 
than to the protocol functions being 
performed by President Alija Izetbegovic 
and Haris Silajdzic, both key figures in 
the Coalition for a United and 
Democratic Bosnia. Izetbegovic clocked 
up 11 protocol appearances, and, on the 
eve of the electoral silence, an hour and a 
half interview with TV BiH chief editor, 
Senad Kamenica. At the end of this 
interview, Kamenica asked, ‘have you got 
a message for your voters? Izetbegovic 
replied ‘Vote for the Coalition for a 
United and Democratic Bosnia, for this is 
where the SDA is. You will find the 
Coalition in the last place on your voting 
list.’ (12/9) 
(NOTE - the figures that RTV BiH published 
last fortnight (4/9) supposedly showed the SDP 
occupying more airtime than any other party. However,  
the SDA’s total airtime, if added to that of other 
members of the Coalition for a United and Democratic 
Bosnia, including Haris Silajdzic and his party, and to 
the airtime of the Coalition itself, easily outstrips the totals 
achieved by all other parties and coalitions). 
Silajdzic appeared 19 times on TV 
BiH, in protocol functions and as 
commentator. As usual, his appearances 
far exceeded the entire total of 
appearances by Croat and Serb members 
of the Federation government. He had an 
hour-and-a-half interview on September 
9, and the presenter allowed him to spend 
almost all of this period criticising SDP 
leader Zlatko Lagumdzija - the Coalition’s 
most serious rival in Federation territory 
not occupied by the HDZ. 
RTV BiH coverage of events in the RS 
was most notably inadequate on Radio 
BiH, which consistently gave them poor 
placing and sketchy, even misleading, 
coverage. The unsuccessful SDS rally in 
Banja Luka which ended with Momcilo 
Krajisnik and his bodyguard being 
trapped in Banja Luka’s Hotel Bosnia 
(8/9) was virtually ignored, although Oko 
22 and OBN gave it peak placing. 
Instead, a ten hour-old statement by 
Izetbegovic’s spokesman, Mirza Hajric 
was read out on the newscast of 
September 9. This stated that the meeting 
of the BiH presidency, scheduled for that 
morning, could not be held, as president 
of the presidency Momcilo Krajisnik had 
failed ‘for unknown reasons’ to appear. 
The confusion continued next day - while 
other media reported how Krajisnik had 
finally left the hotel and was speaking at a 
rally in Bijelina, Radio BiH told listeners 
that Krajisnik had phoned in ‘from who 
knows where’ to explain he was 
unavoidably detained from the presidency 
meeting.   
Although the Federation state media 
have never taken the step of placing news 
from the RS in the foreign news bloc in 
their schedules, RS events, especially in 
the SDS controlled regions of the entity 
are taking on an increasingly remote 
atmosphere on RTV BiH.  
ELECTION COVERAGE IN THE 
RS 
The extent to which RS media were 
politically impartial during the pre-
election fortnight, is perhaps most vividly 
illustrated by statistics: 
 Independent TV Banja Luka 
mentioned Momcilo Krajsnik 9 times, 
always in a negative context, and Biljana 
Plavsic 27 times, always positively. The 
SDS got 14 negative appearances, the RS 
Socialists 14 positive. (The only time 
Independent TV Banja Luka broke the 
electoral silence was in order to run a 
promotive jingle for the Socialist party, 
11/9. Criticised by the OSCE, it 
nevertheless ran the jingle again at seven 
p.m. on September 12.)   
Independent Banja Luka daily Dnevne 
Nezavisne Novine had 15 positive items on 
Plavsic, and 15 negative items on 
Krajisnik. It had 22 negative statements 
to make about the SDS, eight positive on 
the Socialist party, while a broad variety 
of RS opposition parties received an 
average of two positive comments. (This 
paper offered by far the most 
comprehensive coverage of RS 
opposition achieved by any medium 
monitored.)  
SDS-approved daily Glas Srpski 
mentioned Plavsic and Krajisnik 21 times, 
but his appearances were positive, hers 
negative. The SDS received a record 28 
positive appearances. No one even 
remotely qualified as a runner-up - the 
Serb Radical Party came next with three. 
Monitoring Report has no figures for 
SRT Banja Luka, but it was observable 
that the SDS and its leaders were always 
mentioned in a negative context, 
particularly after the disastrous rally of 
September 8. Biljana Plavsic’s party, the 
Serb National Society, was always 
mentioned in a positive context. 
SRT Pale mentioned the SDS in a 
positive context a total of 25 times, while 
Plavsic was mentioned 25 times in a 
negative context. The Serb Radical Party 
was again the closest contender for 
promotion, being mentioned positively 
three times 
None of these media at any point 
promoted a multi-ethnic political party, or 
any Federation-based political party. All 
politicians promoted were Serbs. All 
parties were RS-based. Federation-based 
parties and non-Serb politicians were 
never mentioned in a positive context. 
’STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL’ 
- Dani Stirs It Up 
‘DANI IS IN POSSESSION OF 
STRICTLY GUARDED OSCE 
DOCUMENTS, WHICH THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
WILL USE FOR WAR ON THE 
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MAFIA OF THE HDZ AND 
HERCEG-BOSNA.’  
These words march across the cover 
of the 59th (September 1997) number of 
this independent Sarajevo-based 
magazine. They are superimposed on 
what looks like a document with an 
authentic OSCE heading. This heading, 
however, turns out to be superimposed in 
its turn on an unheaded page, written in 
English, which offers tantalising glimpses 
of phrases such as ‘Intelligence Structures 
in “Herceg-Bosna”’.  
This cover has contributed largely to 
OSCE rage over the actual article inside 
the magazine. The rage has been carried 
to considerable lengths. The seriousness 
of OSCE reactions escalated sharply 
during the pre-election week. Initially, 
David Foley, spokesman for OSCE, told 
his audience at a September 4 press 
conference that the article is ‘fraudulent’ - 
Dani have ‘embarrassed themselves by 
being fooled by this fraud and done their 
readers a disservice by misinforming 
them.’ But in a statement issued on 
September 11 OSCE not only rejected 
the article once more, but also added that 
it is considering legal action against the 
magazine.  
What had happened in the intervening 
period? The HDZ claimed the article - 
and its implications - were a contributing 
factor to their September 9 decision to 
boycott the BiH elections. And on 
September 12 David Foley told 
journalists that OSCE’s denouncement of 
the article as a total fraud had helped the 
HDZ to revoke this decision 
What are the implications of the 
article? It purports to be a condensed 
version of a 70-page internal document 
used by OSCE’s Mostar mission, 
describing the criminal and political 
networks of the short-lived Herceg-Bosna 
Republic. The article takes the form of a 
dossier: pictures and short biographies of 
persons who apparently played key roles 
in the life of the Republic and the war 
against the Bosniaks. Some of the persons 
are now in Croat prisons, but some are 
currently influential members of the 
HDZ - the latter include top HDZ 
leaders. Mentioned are President of 
Croatia Franjo Tudjman; President of the 
Federation Vladimir Soljic, Croatia 
defence minsiter Gojko Susak, and B&H 
foreign minister Jadranko Prlic.  
The text hints - though does not 
explicitly state - that all four were deeply 
involved in criminal activities. Some of 
the facts are ancient history, others are 
preceded by qualifying statements such as 
‘it is alleged that’… ‘it is thought that’. 
(Generally speaking, verifiable statements 
are given as fact; non-verifiable 
statements are qualified.)  
None of the non-verifiable allegations 
are particularly grave. For example, ‘there 
are unproved reports that X recently 
spent around 1 000 000 DM on buying a 
yacht’; ‘X is thought to have been 
involved in black market business, selling 
fuel to the Bosnian Serb army.’   
But the existence of such a document, 
if it is not a fake, implies what the HDZ 
may have felt to be far more serious - that 
OSCE policy includes keeping what 
virtually amount to dossiers - even 
criminal dossiers - on politicians involved 
in “Herceg-Bosna”. (Nevertheless, the 
OSCE states that its ‘Regional 
Stabilisation’ department in Mostar has 
no investigative aspect).  
A huge media furore surrounds the 
case. State and independent media 
throughout Croatia and the Federation 
have covered it, some sympathising with 
Dani, and hinting the article is indeed 
authentic; others suggesting that the 
OSCE repudiation has hardly been fierce 
enough. Monitoring Report interviewed two 
key persons involved in the case - Dani’s 
editor-in-chief Senad Pecanin, and OSCE 
spokesman David Foley. 
To begin, one of the hottest issues can 
be resolved straight away: Senad Pecanin 
admits without hesitation that the OSCE 
heading superimposed on the unheaded 
cover page was designed by his art 
department. ‘It was interesting for our 
readers’ he says. David Foley is therefore 
justified when he demonstrates to 
inquirers, with the help of the headed 
paper that he himself uses, that the 
heading is not even a good imitation of 
the OSCE Mostar mission’s official 
format.  
The issue is clouded, however, by 
Foley’s remark that documents for 
internal use only are not always headed. 
The fact that the heading is fake, 
therefore, advances the question of the 
document’s authenticity no further. 
About the origins of the 70-page 
document the article is allegedly drawn 
from, Senad Pecanin is adamant. ‘I waited 
and waited until I had absolute 
confirmation that the document was 
genuine’, he says, adding that the 
document dates from May 1997, and he 
has known of it since June. Former 
journalist David Foley’s retort is, ‘Why 
didn’t he contact us before he went 
public with this thing? We could have 
proved to him that it was a fake. And it 
would have been good journalistic 
practice to let us know in advance.’ Senad 
Pecanin shrugs. ‘I don’t ask Alija 
Izetbegovic, or the AID (the Bosniak-run 
Agency of Research and Documentation, 
also targeted in the September Dani) 
before I publish confidential material on 
them. Why should I make an exception 
for the OSCE?’ 
Both sides fiercely maintain their 
positions; neither can produce evidence. 
Senad Pecanin can dignify his position 
with the alleged need to protect his 
source. Foley is in the tougher position of 
having to prove a negative, and does so 
with the help of the oft-repeated word 
‘fraudulent’. Pecanin claims that certain 
Western diplomats have told him that to 
their certain knowledge the original 
document was indeed a genuine OSCE 
product. Foley dismisses this as ‘a 
smokescreen of lies’. 
Pecanin’s last word on the subject is 
that he is able and willing to go to court 
to prove his case. David Foley’s final 
word is that ‘any decision to prosecute 
will depend on the findings of the Media 
Experts Commission’ (MEC).  
This body met at the time of writing 
(19/9), but Dani was not on its agenda. 
Nor had the MEC’s investigative 
commission yet received notification of 
what the actual contents of the article 
were. However, ‘we are investigating it’ 
says MEC chairman Lynwood Todd, ‘and 
I assure you that we shall do so very 
thoroughly.’ 
NOTE TO OUR READERS 
Monitoring Report would like to bid its 
leaders farewell, at least for the present. 
IWPR and Media Plan have been 
monitoring the Bosnian Media, and 
providing uninterrupted analysis of it 
since June 1996. Monitoring Report began 
coverage of the Bih media in the context 
of last year’s general elections, which 
formed the context of the first series. 
Following the September elections, 
Monitoring Report shifted to observing 
how well the media were fulfilling the 
obligations demanded by the Dayton 
Agreement. This last series was intended 
to focus on media treatment of the local 
election campaigns. Our focus altered 
slightly over the summer in response to 
developments in the Republika Srpska, 
and the internal media war that broke out 
as a result.  
With the story far from complete, and 
the media far from settled, it is an 
unfortunate time to have to end the 
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monitoring, but we would like to express 
our sincere thanks to the Swedish 
Internal Development Agency (SIDA) 
which has supported the project this past 
year and previously. It has done so in 
association with the Open Society 
Institute, the Winston Foundation for 
World Peace, and the Friedrich 
Naumann Stiftung (association). The 
Monitoring Project was established, not 
as an academic exercise, but as a reliable 
information source and guide to the 
professional behaviour of the Bosnian 
media after Dayton. Since its launch, the 
report has been freely available in both 
English and Bosnian, with the intention 
of being relevant and useful to colleagues 
in the Bosnian media.  
As an industry, the Bosnian media is 
still a long way from being either fair or 
free. Nevertheless, we do see many 
hopeful signs for the future. Most 
importantly of all, we hope that the 
essential value of monitoring has been 
proved locally, and that monitoring will 
continue informally, throughout Bosnia, 
in cafes as well as newsrooms. 
 IWPR & MEDIA PLAN 
